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Abstract
We address the problem of verifying neural-based percep-
tion systems implemented by convolutional neural net-
works. We define a notion of local robustness based on
affine and photometric transformations. We show the no-
tion cannot be captured by previously employed notions
of robustness. The method proposed is based on reach-
ability analysis for feed-forward neural networks and re-
lies on MILP encodings of both the CNNs and transfor-
mations under question. We present an implementation
and discuss the experimental results obtained for a CNN
trained from the MNIST data set.
1 Introduction
Autonomous systems are forecasted to revolutionise key
aspects of modern life including mobility, logistics, and
beyond. While considerable progress has been made on
the underlying technology, severe concerns remain about
the safety of the autonomous systems under development.
One of the difficulties with forthcoming autonomous
systems is that they incorporate complex components that
are not programmed by engineers, but are synthesised
from data via machine learning methods (often called
learning-enabled components). Additionally, there is an
increasing trend to deploy autonomous systems in safety-
critical areas including autonomous vehicles. These two
aspects taken together call for the development of rigor-
ous methods for the formal verification of autonomous
systems based on learning-enabled components, see, e.g.,
DARPA’s Assured Autonomy program 1.
1https://www.darpa.mil/program/
assured-autonomy.
One of the most widely considered architectures com-
bining traditionally programmed and learning-enabled
components is control systems (or decision making and
planning modules) paired with perception systems based
on data-trained classifiers. Forthcoming autonomous ve-
hicles, among other systems, use this architecture. While
there are methods to formally assess the adequacy of de-
cision making and control components, no existing tech-
nique can provide formal guarantees about the correctness
of perception systems based on machine learning meth-
ods. Not only this makes it hard to formally establish the
correctness of perception systems before deployment, it
also impedes the provision of formal assurances on the
overall autonomous system, since the control components
normally receive input from the classifiers of the percep-
tion component.
In this paper we aim to make a contribution towards
solving this problem. Specifically, we introduce a method
to give formal guarantees to perception systems based on
convolutional neural networks (CNNs) [8]. Towards this
end, we develop a concept of robustness for CNN-based
perception systems with respect to affine and photometric
transformations, i.e., changes in the position and colour
patterns of the image. These can be used to anticipate the
natural variability of the input to the perception mecha-
nism when the system is deployed. Intuitively, establish-
ing that for all the possible transformations of the input
(up to a certain measure) the CNN classifies the image in
the same way helps us understand the robustness of the
perception system with respect to said transformations.
Moreover, whenever misclassifications are found, these
can usefully be used to retrain the network and improve
its accuracy. The method we introduce relies on recasting
the problem in mixed-integer linear programming (MILP)
and leverages on recent work on reachability analysis for
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feed-forward neural networks, which we extend here to
CNNs. Two key features of our approach which make
it different from recent approaches discussed below are
that: (i) we study robustness with respect to image trans-
formations as opposed to pixel alterations, (2) the method
is complete, i.e., if a missclassification exists with respect
to a transformation the method is theoretically guaranteed
to find it. Completeness is particularly important for the
purposes of guaranteeing correctness.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. After
discussing related work below, in Section 2 we introduce
CNNs and image transformations. In Section 3 we de-
velop the concept of local transformational robustness and
give examples of applications. We turn to the verification
problem for CNN-based classifiers in Section 4 where we
construct the MILP encoding of the problem and show the
soundness and completeness of the approach. We present
an implementation in Section 5 and report experimen-
tal results obtained for a CNN trained from the MNIST
dataset. We conclude in Section 6.
Related Work. The notions of affine and photometric
transformations are well understood in the literature [11,
21]. Classifiers are normally evaluated in statical terms
against false positives and false negatives [3]. While these
studies are relevant, they do not have the same aim as ours,
which is to formally assess the correctness of a classifier
with respect to image transformations.
More relevant to our aims is the recent work [7] on the
verification of feed-forward networks, which includes a
section on the local robustness of CNN-based classifiers.
This works differs from ours in several respects. Firstly,
local robustness, as defined there, captures regions (or ab-
stract domains) of image perturbations. Differently, we
here deal with a wide range of geometric and photometric
transformations. If we were to express these by means of
abstract domains, we would have to over-approximate the
input domain, thereby obtaining robustness violations not
relevant to the transformations under analysis. Instead, by
developing the concept of local transformational robust-
ness we can provide tighter notions of correctness than
by purely working on local robustness. The technical de-
tails of the two approaches are also different. While [7]
uses abstract interpretation as underlying method we here
compile into MILP problems. While abstract interpreta-
tion provides better performance than MILP, it comes at
the cost of completeness, which is a key requirement for
the purposes of verification.
Related to this, there is a fast increasing body of re-
search addressing reachability and robustness analysis for
neural networks [13, 6, 16, 15, 12]. While our approach
is similar in terms of the underlying method, the aims are
different since, rather than analysing reachability and ro-
bustness in abstract terms, we here intend to contribute to
the concrete problem of verifying learning-enabled per-
ception modules. When perception systems are consid-
ered in these works, they are assessed with respect to pixel
variations of the images and not transformations as we do
here. We are not the first to suggest that image transfor-
mations should be considered when assessing the robust-
ness of image classifiers. This point was raised very re-
cently also by [20] (referred to there as “semantic invari-
ance”). However, that work is intended as initial founda-
tional work and proposes no method to solve the problem.
Related to this submission is also the unpublished [18]
which proposes a generic framework for evaluating the
safety of computer vision systems. In common with
this paper it aims to establish correctness of a classifica-
tion with respect to image transformations. Differently
from ours, their approach however is based on heuristic
search for counterexamples. While it is shown to pro-
vide advantages over previous state-of-the-art based on
gradient-based methods, it is necessarily incomplete, i.e.,
the method cannot give guarantees that if a missclassifica-
tions exists this will be found. In contrast we here focus
on completeness as a requirement, i.e., we guarantee that
(up to computational power) any and all missclassifica-
tions will be found by the method. We cannot compare
experimental results to [18] as the paper is unpublished
and we do not have access to the tool described therein.
Lastly, as it will be clear from the rest of the paper,
by using the results here presented, whenever we identify
that a perception module is not robust, i.e., it classifies im-
ages differently following small transformations, our pro-
cedures return the witness of this misclassification. This
can be seen as an adversarial example, see, e.g. [17], for
the relevant classifier. Research in adversarial examples
directly aims at finding these counterexamples. However,
none of these methods is complete, hence they cannot be
used to show formal correctness which is the primary aim
of this work.
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2 Preliminaries
Learning-enabled components for perception are typically
image classifiers implemented via CNNs. We here sum-
marise CNNs, CNN-defined image classifiers, and define
image transformations as distortions. We refer to [8, 19]
for more details.
CNNs are directed acyclic graphs whose nodes are
structured in layers. The first layer is said to be the in-
put layer, the last layer is referred to as the output layer,
and every layer in-between is called a hidden layer. Every
layer is either a fully connected layer or a convolutional
layer.
Each node of a fully connected layer is connected to
every node in the preceding layer, whereas every node of
a convolutional layer is only connected to a rectangular
neighbourhood of nodes in the preceding layer. In either
case every connection is associated with a weight.
A fully connected layer is composed of two phases,
whereas a convolutional layer comprises three phases. In
both cases the first phase linearly activates the nodes by
outputting the weighted sum of their inputs, and the sec-
ond phase applies a non-linear activation function to the
linear activation. Here we consider the Rectified Linear
Unit (ReLU) whose output is the maximum between 0 and
the linear activation. The third phase of a convolutional
layer further applies a pooling function to collapse rect-
angular neighborhoods of activations into representative
activations. Here we focus on the max-pooling function
where the maximum activation is chosen as the represen-
tative one.
CNNs are routinely used to solve image classification
problems. The problem concerns the approximation of
an unspecified function f? : Rα×β×γ → {1, . . . , c} that
takes as input an image im from an unknown distribu-
tion Rα×β×γ (where α × β are the pixels of the image
and γ is the number of the color bands, e.g. RGB) and
determines among a set of classes {1, . . . , c} the class to
which im is a member. The problem is tackled by train-
ing a CNN by means of a labelled training set thereby
setting the weights of the network so that its output ap-
proximates f? [8]. Following this, the CNN can be used
to infer the class of novel images by feeding an image to
the input layer and then propagating it through the net-
work. At each step the outputs of the nodes in a layer are
computed from the outputs of the previous layer, resulting
in the input to the output layer. The output layer is a fully
connected layer that composes precisely a node per label
class and whose activation function outputs the index of
the node with the largest linear activation as the classifi-
cation decision. In the following we assume the weights
of a CNN have been trained.
To fix the notation, we use [n] for {1, . . . , n} and
[n1, n2] for {n1, . . . , n2}. We fix a CNN CNN with a
set of layers [n]. We assume the nodes in a convolutional
layer are arranged into a three dimensional array. Inter-
changeably we sometimes treat this arrangement as re-
shaped into a vector. The nodes in a fully connected layer
are arranged into a vector. The output of the (j, k, r)-st (j-
th, respectively) node in a convolutional (fully connected,
respectively) layer i is represented by x(i)j,k,r (x
(i)
j , respec-
tively). We denote by x(i) the vector of all the nodes’
outputs in layer i. We write s(i) for the size of layer i and
s
(i)
j for the size of the j-th dimension of a convolutional
layer i.
We now proceed to formally define every layer 2 ≤
i ≤ n as a function f (i) : Rs(i−1) → Rs(i) and con-
sequently the CNN composing these. We begin with
a fully connected layer i. The layer is associated with
a weight matrix W (i) ∈ Rs(i)×s(i−1) and a bias vec-
tor b
(i) ∈ Rs(i) . The linear activation of the layer
is given by the weighted sum WS(x(i−1)) = W (i) ·
x(i−1)+b
(i)
. The function computed by the layer can then
be defined as f (i)(x(i−1)) = 
(
WS
(
x(i−1)
))
, where
 ∈ {ReLU,Argmax} with the function ReLU(x) =
max(0, x) being applied element-wise to the linear ac-
tivation. We now give the definition of a convolu-
tional layer i. The layer is associated with a group
Conv(i),1, . . . ,Conv(i),k of k ≥ 1 convolutions and
a max-pooling function Pool(i). Each convolution
Conv(i),j : Rs(i−1) → R(s(i−1)1 −p+1)×(s(i−1)2 −q+1) is pa-
rameterised over a weight matrix (kernel) K(i),j ∈
Rp×q×s
(i−1)
3 , where p ≤ s(i−1)1 , q ≤ s(i−1)2 , and
a bias vector b
(i)
j . The (u, v)-st output of the j-st
convolution is given by Conv(i),ju,v (x
(i−1)) = K(i),j ·
x
(i−1)
[u,u′],[v,v′],[s(i−1)3 ]
+ b
(i)
j , where u
′ = u+ p− 1 and v′ =
v + q − 1. Given the outputs of each of the convolutions,
the linear activation of the layer Conv(i) : Rs(i−1) →
3
R(s
(i−1)
1 −p+1)×(s(i−1)2 −q+1)×k forms a three-dimensional
matrix, i.e. Conv(i) =
[
Conv
(i)
1 . . . Conv
(i)
k
]
.
The non-linear activation of the layer is then computed
by the application of the ReLU function. In the fi-
nal phase, the max-pooling function collapses neigh-
borhoods of size p′ × q′ of the latter activations to
their maximum values. Formally, Pool(i) : Ru×v×r →
R
u
p′× vq′×r, where u = (s(i−1)1 − p + 1) and v =
(s
(i−1)
2 − q + 1), is defined as follows: Pool(i)u,v,r =
max
(
Conv
(i)
[(u−1)p+1,u·p],[(v−1)q+1,v·q],r
)
The function
computed by the layer is then defined by f (i)(x(i−1)) =
Pool(i)
(
ReLU
(
Conv(i)
(
x(i−1)
)))
.
Given the above a convolutional neural network can be
defined as the composition of fully connected and convo-
lutional layers.
Definition 1 (Convolutional neural network). A convolu-
tional neural network CNN : Rα×β×γ → [c] is defined
as
CNN (im) = f (n)(f (n−1)(. . . f (1)(x) . . .))
where im ∈ Rα×β×γ , f (1), . . . , f (n−1) are either
ReLU fully connected or convolutional layers, f (n) is an
Argmax fully connected layer, and [c] is a set of class
labels.
Image transformations. We briefly describe affine
and photometric transformations. An affine transforma-
tion is a mapping between affine spaces that preserves
collinearity and ratios of distances [11]. It is represented
in vector algebra as follows.x′y′
1
 =
a11 a12 txa21 a22 ty
0 0 1
xy
1

where (x, y) is a point,A =
[
a11 a12
a21 a22
]
is a non-singular
matrix, and t = (tx, ty)T is the translation vector.
An affine transformation wherebyA equals the identity
matrix is said to be a translation. An affine transforma-
tion is referred to as scaling ifA = σI , tx = 0 and ty = 0
for a scale factor σ. In the case where σ < 1 the scaling is
called subsampling, whereas in the case where σ > 1 the
scaling is known as zooming. Given a transformation T
we write doff(T) for the tuple of degrees of freedom in T,
e.g., if T is a translation, then doff(T) = (tx, ty). Given
d ∈ R| doff(T)|, we denote by T[d] the concretisation of T
whereby every parameter doff(T)i is set to di. In this pa-
per we consider translations and scaling transformations,
both in isolation and in composition with themselves.
A photometric transformation is an affine change in the
intensity of the pixels [21]. It is defined as f(p) = αp+β.
If 0 < α < 1, then the transformation reduces the contrast
of the image. Otherwise, if α > 1, the transformation
increases the contrast of the image. The factor β controls
the luminosity of the image with higher values pertaining
to brighter images.
3 Local transformational robust-
ness
CNNs are known to be susceptible to adversarial attacks.
Slight perturbations of an image, even imperceptible to
the human eye, can cause the misclassification of the im-
age [17]. As mentioned in the introduction a recent body
of work aims at establishing the adversarial local robust-
ness of neural networks against said attacks by adopting
a verification perspective [16, 7, 12, 13]. Specifically,
given an image im, current state-of-the-art methods check
whether all images im
′
with ‖im′ − im‖p ≤ δ, for some
Lp-norm, are classified as belonging to the same class
with im. While this approach can effectively identify
probable misclassification when images marginally differ,
e.g., by a few different pixels, we argue that it is not ad-
equate to identify a much wider class of variations to an
image that should not affect its classification.
Intuitively, a perception system should be assessed as
robust whenever it assigns the same label to every pair
of images that human perception finds indistinguishable.
For instance, autonomous vehicles are expected to cor-
rectly identify objects irrespective of the angle and posi-
tion of the camera, the environment light conditions, the
position of the object in the image, the distance of the ob-
ject from the camera, etc. It follows that the classification
decision should be the same irrespective of minor trans-
lations, scaling, and photometric transforms of the image
from the camera (Figure 1).
Crucially, adversarial local robustness depends on the
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(a) Original. (b) Translation. (c) Subsampling. (d) Zooming. (e) Luminosity. (f) Contrast. (g) Random noise.
Figure 1: Affine and photometric transformations applied on an image from the MNIST dataset.
encapsulation of all indistinguishable images within the
space induced by bounding some distance metric, typi-
cally the infinity norm. Consequently, in order to capture
said transformations in present approaches, the bound on
the distance between the images has to be so large that,
intuitively, distinguishable images would have to be clas-
sified in the same way to meet the predefined distance.
For example, consider Figure 1. The L∞-norm be-
tween the original image and the brightened image
is 17.16, whereas the distance between the original im-
age and the image composed with random noise is 16.02.
Clearly the brightened image should be classified as the
original one whereas the classification of the noisy one is
not as clear. Following these observations, we propose the
formal verification of the robustness of CNNs not just up
to a distance metric, but up to transformations. We call
this the transformational robustness property.
Definition 2 (Local transformational robustness). A con-
volutional neural network CNN is said to be locally
transformationally robust for an image im and a trans-
formation T with domain D ⊆ R| doff(T)| if for all d ∈ D
we have that CNN
(
T[d](im)
)
= CNN (im).
In other words, we say that CNN is locally transfor-
mationally robust if the image in question is classified in
the same way following the transformation under analy-
sis. The emphasis on “local” in the definition above fol-
lows [13, 16] and refers to the fact that the property is rela-
tive to a single image. In contrast, global transformational
robustness is defined independently of the image. We do
not add this definition as the method provided below only
deals with local properties. Also note that the definition
above is parameterised over a domain for the values of
the parameters. Indeed, for verification purposes, it may
be preferable to check only a range of values, e.g., in pho-
tometric transformations it is typically not relevant to con-
sider the transformation for which every pixel is mapped
to the black colour. Hereafter, we assume that the trans-
formation domain is a linearly definable set.
4 Verifying local transformational
robusteness
In this section we develop a procedure for verifying lo-
cal transformational robustness by recasting the prob-
lem into MILP. The procedure takes as input a trained
CNN CNN , an image im with class label lim, and a se-
quence of k transformations T(1), . . . ,T(k) with domains
D(1), . . . ,D(k), respectively. It then constructs an trans-
formational CNN CNN by treating the transformations
as additional layers and appending them to the input layer.
More precisely, CNN = f (n+k+2)(. . . f (1)() . . .), where
f (n+k+2), . . . , f (k+2) are the original layers of CNN ,
f (k+1) is a perturbation layer and f (k), . . . , f (1) =
T(k), . . . ,T(1). The perturbation layer helps to simulate
subpixel transformations; this will be discussed below.
The transformational CNN is then encoded into mixed-
integer linear constraints layer by layer. For each layer
and transformation i we now give the set of linear con-
straints C(i) characterising the various layers and trans-
formations that we consider.
Photometric transformations. We begin by present-
ing the mixed-integer linear encodings for photometric
transformations. A photometric transformation has two
degrees of freedom: the factor µ that handles the contrast
of the image, and the factor ν which controls the luminos-
ity of the image. We assume the minimum value of a pixel
is 0 and write pmax for its maximum value. The possi-
ble instantiations of a photometric transformation are ex-
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pressed by the following linear constraints.
λd ≥ min
d
(D(i)) and λd ≤ max
d
(D(i)), d ∈ dof(T(i))
(C1)
where each λd is an LP variable controlling the values of
the factor d, and mind(D(i)) (maxd(D(i)), respectively)
denotes the minimum (maximum, respectively) value for
the factor d in D(i). To encode the result of a photometric
transformation on a pixel we simply express the corre-
sponding linear operation.
T(i)px(x
(i−1)) = µ · x(i−1)px + ν (C2)
Given this, the linear encoding of a photometric trans-
formation T(i) is then given by the set of constraints
C(i) = C1 ∪ C2.
Affine transformations. We now turn to translating
affine transformations. For each case we use a set of con-
straints of the form C1 capturing the set of possible in-
stantiations of the transformation. Also, for each case, we
introduce a binary variable δ(i)d for every instantiation d.
The variable represents whether the corresponding instan-
tiation is the one being applied. At any time we assume
the application of precisely one instantiation by imposing
the constraint: ∑
d∈D(i)
δ
(i)
d = 1 (C3)
We also force a bijection between the set of δ variables
and the instantiations they represent by assuming:∑
d∈D(i)
dj · δ(i)d = λj for each d.o.f. j in T(i) (C4)
So δ(i)d = 1 iff, for each d.o.f. j, the LP variable λj repre-
senting j equals dj .
We now present the encodings of each of the transfor-
mations. We begin by considering geometric translation.
A translation shifts the location of every pixel as per the
translation vector (u′, v′):
T(i)u,v,r(x
(i−1)) =
∑
(u′,v′)∈D(i)
x
(i)
u+u′,v+v′,r · δ(i)u′,v′ (C5)
Therefore, the linear encoding for a translation T(i) is de-
fined as C(i) = C1 ∪ C3 ∪ C4 ∪ C5.
Next we consider subsampling. The transformation
collapses neighbourhoods of points to a point whose value
is a statistic approximation of the neighbourhood. Here
we consider the arithmetic mean value. The size of the
neighbourhood is controlled by the scaling factor d.
T(i)u,v,r(x
(i−1)) =
∑
d∈D(i)
AM(x
(i−1)
[(u−1)d,u·d],[(v−1)d,v·d],r) · δ(i)d
(C6)
It follows that the linear encoding for a subsampling T(i)
is defined as C(i) = C1 ∪ C3 ∪ C4 ∪ C6.
Lastly, we consider zooming. Zooming replicates the
value of a pixel to a rectangular neighbourhood of pix-
els. The value of the neighbourhood is controlled by the
scaling factor d.
T(i)u,v,r(x
(i−1)) =
∑
d∈D(i)
x
(i−1)
dud e,d vd e,r · δ
(i)
d (C7)
Therefore, the linear encoding for a zooming T(i) is
defined as C(i) = C1 ∪ C3 ∪ C4 ∪ C7.
Perturbations. Next we describe the linear encod-
ing of the perturbation layer. The layer is introduced to
simulate subpixel transformations. Whereas interpolation
can be recast to MILP so as compute the transformations,
the number of binary variables needed for the encoding
is overwhelming w.r.t the performance of the verifier, as
also showed by implementations we developed. In con-
trast, the perturbation layer results in a conciser program
whereby only two inequalities per pixel are used. The
layer perturbs each pixel within an L∞ norm-ball. Given
the radius of the norm-ball is sufficiently big, i.e., equal to
the variance of the image, the layer captures each of the
images that could be computed via interpolations. Con-
sequently it enables the derivation of stronger robustness
guarantees than the ones that could be given by using a
specific interpolation. The linear encoding of the layer is
given for each pixel px by the following constraints.
x(k+1)px − x(k)px ≤ ρ (C8)
x(k+1)px − x(k)px ≥ −ρ (C9)
where ρ is a given radius.
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We now consider the encodings of the layers of the
CNN under question. We separately translate these phase
by phase.
Fully connected layer. We give the MILP description
of the weighted sum and ReLU functions. We do not di-
rectly represent the Argmax function since the function is
not essential in expressing the local transformational ro-
bustness properties that we are here concerned with (see
below). The weighted sum function is given be the fol-
lowing:
WSj(x
(i−1)) = W (i)j · x(i−1)j + b
(i)
j (C10)
To capture the piecewise-linearity of the ReLU function
we introduce a binary variable δ(i)j per node j that repre-
sents whether the output of the node is above 0 [1].
ReLUj(x
(i−1)) ≥ 0 (C11)
ReLUj(x
(i−1)) ≥WSj(x(i−1)) (C12)
ReLUj(x
(i−1)) ≤WSj(x(i−1)) +Mδ(i)j (C13)
ReLUj(x
(i−1)) ≤M(1− δ(i)j ) (C14)
Above M is a sufficiently large number. Therefore the
linear encoding of a fully connected layer i is defined by
C(i) = C10 ∪ . . . ∪ C14.
Convolutional layer. In addition to the ReLU phase,
a convolutional layer includes a convolution and a max-
pooling phase. Similarly to the weighted-sum function, a
convolution is a linear operation on the input of the layer
and can be encoded by the following:
Conv(i),ju,v (x
(i−1)) = K(i)j · x(i−1)[u,u′],[v,v′],[s(i−1)3 ] + b
(i)
j ,
u′ = u+ p− 1, v′ = v + q − 1.
(C15)
A max-pooling function is parameterised over the size of
the groups of pixels over which the max-pooling is per-
formed. Previous linear encodings of the function use a
binary variable per node in a group [5]. We here pro-
vide an encoding that uses logarithmically less variables.
Specifically, to select the maximum value from a group
we introduce a sequence of binary variables. The se-
quence’s binary number expresses the node in a group
whose value is maximum. Since the size of the group
is p · q we use dlog2(p · q)e variables. To facilitate the
presentation of the corresponding linear constraints, we
write n for the binary representation of n ∈ Z. We
denote by |n| the number of binary digits in n. Given
j ∈ |n|, nj expresses the j-th digit in n whereby the first
digit is the least significant bit. If j > |n|, then we as-
sume that nj = 0. The linear representation of the max-
pooling function for a pixel px = (pxα, pxβ , pxγ) and
pool size p× q is given by the following.
Pool(i)px ≥ Conv(i)(pxα−1)p+u′,(pxβ−1)q+v′,pxγ ,
u′ ∈ [p], v′ ∈ [v] (C16)
Pool(i)px ≤ Conv(i)(pxα−1)p+u′,(pxβ−1)q+v′,pxγ +
M
∑
j∈[|p·q|]
zj + (1− 2zj)δ(i)px,j ,
u′ ∈ [p], v′ ∈ [v], z = (u′ − 1)q + v′ − 1
(C17)
where δ(i)px,1, . . . , δ
(i)
dlog2(px,p·q)e are the binary variables
associated with px. For the case where p · q is not a
power of 2 we require from the number represented by
δ
(i)
px,1, . . . , δ
(i)
dlog2(px,p·q)e to lie within 0, . . . , p · q− 1. The
constraint is formally expressed as follows.∑
j∈|p·q|
zj + (1− 2zj)δ(i)px,q ≥ 1,
z ∈ [p · q, 2|p·q| − 1] (C18)
Example 1. Assume the application of the max-pooling
function on a group of nodes x1, . . . , x4. Let y denote the
output of the function. Its MILP encoding as per (16)-
(19) uses two binary variables δ1, δ2 and is given by the
following.
y ≥ xj , j ∈ [4]
y ≤ x1 +M(δ1 + δ2)
y ≤ x2 +M(1− δ1 + δ2)
y ≤ x3 +M(δ1 + 1− δ2)
y ≤ x4 +M(1− δ1 + 1− δ2)
The linear encoding of a convolutional layer i is defined
by C(i) = C15 ∪ . . . ∪ C18.
Given the above, the linear encoding of a transforma-
tional CNN can be defined as the union of the linear con-
straints characterising its layers.
7
Definition 3 (Linear encoding of transformational
CNNs). The linear encoding of a transformational CNN
CNN = fn(fn−1(. . . f1() . . .)) is defined by C(CNN ) =
C(1) ∪ . . . ∪ C(n).
We can exploit the above encoding to construct a linear
program whose solution corresponds to a solution of the
robustness problem for the CNN under analysis. Indeed,
we can extend the above encoding to represent the local
robustness property.
Local transformational robustness. We now define
linear constraints to determine whether there are instanti-
ations for the transformations of the original image im
whose output is classified differently than im. More
specifically, we check whether there is a linear activa-
tion in the output layer that is larger than the activation
associated with the class lim of im. Similarly to the
max-pooling function we express this by introducing a se-
quence of size dlog2 ce of binary variables; the sequence’s
binary number b denotes the node from the output layer
that is associated with class b + 1 ∈ [c] and whose linear
activation is larger than the linear activation of the node
associated with lim.
WSlim(x
(n−1)) ≤WSj(x(n−1))+
M
∑
k∈|c|
(
jk + (1− 2jk)δ(n)k
)
,
j ∈ [0, c− 1] \ {lim − 1} (C19)
Again, we prevent δ(n)0 , . . . , δ
(n)
dlog2 ce from representing
lim − 1 or any number greater than c− 1:∑
k∈|c|
jk + (1− 2jk)δ(n)k ≥ 1,
j ∈ {lim − 1} ∪ [c, 2|c| − 1]. (C20)
The linear encoding of local robustness is then defined
by C(lrob) = C19 ∪ C20.
In summary, we have shown that all the affine and
photometric transformations considered are naturally cap-
tured by appropriate sets of linear constraints. Moreover,
we have shown that the property of local transformational
robustness can naturally be encoded into a set of linear
constraints. We now give the main result of this section
by formally linking local transformational robustness of a
given CNN with respect to a particular image and a trans-
formation and the lack of a solution for the corresponding
MILP problem.
Theorem 1. LetCNN be a CNN,T a transformation with
domain D, and im an image. Let LP be the linear prob-
lem defined on objective function obj = 0 and set of con-
straints C(im) ∪ C(CNN ) ∪ C(lrob), where C(im) , x(0) =
im fixes the input of T to im. Then CNN is locally trans-
formationally robust for T and im iff LP has no solution.
Proof. Let CNN = f (n+1)(. . . f (1)(im) . . .).
For the left to right direction assume that LP has a
feasible solution. Consider d = (λj : j ∈ dof(T)),
where each λj is the value of the d.o.f. dj of T in
the solution. By the definition of LP we have that
CNN (T[d](im)) = Argmax(x(n+1)). By the definition
of C(lrob) there is l with l 6= lim and x(n+1)l ≥ x(n+1)lim .
Therefore CNN (T[d](im)) 6= lim, and therefore CNN is
not locally transformationally robust.
For the right to left direction suppose that CNN is not
locally transformationally robust. It follows that there
is d ∈ D such that CNN (T[d](im)) 6= lim. Then,
the assignment λj = dj , for each d.o.f j of T and
x
(i)
j =
(
f (i)(. . . f (1)(im) . . .)
)
j
is a feasible solution for
LP .
Following the above the local transformational robust-
ness of CNNs can be established whenever the corre-
sponding MILP problem has no solution. Otherwise, if
a feasible solution for the problem can be found, then the
solution corresponds to the instantiations of the transfor-
mations under analysis that violate the robustness of the
CNN. From these, it is possible to determine the sets of
images responsible for the violation. These exemplars are
often called adversarial examples in related literature. Fi-
nally note that the result holds for the composition of any
finite number of transformations considered in the paper.
We conclude by noting that finding adversarial exam-
ples can be used to improve the accuracy of the classi-
fier, e.g., via retraining. On the other hand showing local
transformational robustness can be used to build a formal
safety case for the perception system in question.
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Translation Subsampling Zooming Photometric
D #X (s) LTR D #X (s) LTR D #X (s) LTR D #X (s) LTR
[−1, 1]2 5(48) 0 [2, 3] 97(2) 0 [2, 3] 94(3) 4 [0.01, 0.03]× [0.99, 1.01] 100(1.1) 2
−3, 3]2 63(15) 0 [2, 5] 96(3) 0 [2, 5] 90(1) 7 [0.01, 0.05]× [0.97, 1.03] 100(8.23) 2
[−5, 5]2 87(26) 0 [2, 7] 95(2) 0 [2, 7] 97(4) 2 [0.01, 0.07]× [0.9, 1.1] 100(8.36) 2
[−7, 7]2 90(22) 0 [2, 9] 96(3) 7 [2, 9] 96(3) 7 [0.1, 0.5]× [0.7, 1.3] 100(10.05) 2
[−9, 9]2 90(20) 0 [2, 11] 93(1) 0 [2, 11] 96(3) 7 [0.1, 0.7]× [0.5, 1.5] 97(5.51) 0
Table 1: Experimental results.
5 Implementation and experimental
results
We have implemented the procedures from the previous
section as a toolkit VENUS [2]. The toolkit takes as in-
put the descriptions of a CNN and a sequence of trans-
formations against which the local transformational ro-
bustness of the CNN is meant to be assessed. Following
this VENUS builds the linear encoding of the verification
query layer by layer and following all the transformations
in the input by adding the constraints discussed in the pre-
ceding Section.
Having constructed the linear program the verifier in-
vokes the Gurobi checker [10] to ascertain whether the
program admits a solution. The satisfiability output of
the latter corresponds to the violation of the local trans-
formational robustness property of the CNN, whereas the
unsatisfiability output can be used to assert the CNN is
transformationally locally robust.
We have tested VENUS on networks trained on the
MNIST dataset [14] using the deep learning toolkit
Keras [4]. To the best of our knowledge currently there
are no other methods or tools for the same problem; so,
in what below we report only the results obtained with
VENUS. In the experiments we fixed a CNN of 1481
nodes, with a convolutional layer of 3 convolutions with
kernels of size 15 × 15 and pool-size 2 × 2, and an out-
put layer with 10 nodes. The accuracy of the network on
the MNIST dataset is 93%. To check the network’s trans-
formational local robustness we selected 100 images for
which the network outputs the correct classification label.
We then performed experiments for all of the transfor-
mations with varying domains for each of their degrees
of freedom. The experiments were run on a machine
equipped with an i7-7700 processor and 16GB of RAM
and running Linux kernel version 4.15.0. Table 1 sum-
marises the results.
For every transformation and its domains considered,
we report the number of images that have been verified
(irrespective of whether these were shown robust) under
the timeout of 200s followed by the average time taken
for verifying said images. This is indicated in the column
#X (s). For example, for subsampling transformations on
domain [2, 3], the method could verify 97 images out of
100 with an average time of 2 secs. Following this, in
the LTR column we report the number of these that were
assessed locally transformationally robust.
Note that there is some variability in the results. For ex-
ample, several images could not be assessed by the time-
out for the translation with domain [−1, 1] but many more
could be analysed under the translation domain [−3, 3].
This is likely to be due to optimisations carried out by
Gurobi which can be applied in some cases only. Indeed,
note in general that an increase in the range of the do-
mains does not lead to longer computations times, since
the resulting linear program is only marginally extended.
In summary, the results show that the CNN built
from the MNIST dataset is not locally transformation-
ally robust with respect to translation, subsampling and
zooming, returning different classifications even for small
transformational changes to the input. The CNN appears
just as fragile in terms of luminosity and contrast changes.
Overall, the results show that the CNN in question is brit-
tle with respect to transformational robustness. We stress
that the aim of this work is not to build robust CNNs, but
to provide a provably correct and automatic method that
can be used to make this assessment systematically. If the
CNN that we analysed was intended to be used in as part
of a perception module in a safety-critical autonomous
system, our analysis would suggest that the CNN may be
inadequate.
Still, in the spirit of adversarial retraining, the tech-
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nique here described can be used to augment the training
set so as to improve the robustness of the network under
analysis [9]. To test this we trained a CNN with images
from the MNIST dataset (60000 images) and recorded its
classification accuracy as 19% on transformed MNIST
images. We then used VENUS to generate over 10000
transformed images (for compositions of transformations
here considered) which we appended to the training set.
The augmented set was then used to retrain the network
resulting in a classification accuracy of 26%. This exem-
plifies VENUS not only as a verification tool but also as a
tool to improve the robustness of CNNs.
We conclude by noting that we conducted further tests
with images of different sizes. As expected, we found that
the effectiveness of the toolkit is hindered by increases in
the size of the network, as these lead to heavier MILP
encodings. This has already been reported in the litera-
ture [5] and points to further work to improve scalability
further.
6 Conclusions
Forthcoming autonomous systems are expected to rel. as-
pects of modern society. Several of these, including au-
tonomous vehicles, are effectively safety-critical systems,
i.e., they are systems in which malfunctions may lead to
loss of life. Differently for other non-autonomous safety-
critical systems, such as avionics systems, no methods
presently exist to give formal guarantees to large classes
of autonomous systems. Providing formal guarantees for
autonomous systems in which learning-enabled compo-
nents are present (i.e., components synthesised from data
via machine learning methods) is presently an open chal-
lenge. We believe that research is urgently needed to ad-
dress this deficiency.
To this end, in this paper we have considered a class of
perception systems often present in autonomous systems,
i.e., CNN-based classifiers commonly used in the percep-
tion modules of autonomous systems. While CNNs are
regularly used in various applications where their correct-
ness and accuracy is not essential, their use in autonomous
systems requires a high degree of assurance. Typically
this is either directly provided by, or aided by formal
methods, as in the case of DO-333/ED-216 in avionics.
This is also likely to be required for certification purposes
of the system.
To this end, we have introduced a notion of robust-
ness, called local transformational robustness, which can
be used to give guarantees on the perception system un-
der analysis. Local transformational robustness encodes
the ability of a classifier to withstand variations of the im-
age in question with respect to its classification. These
modifications, encoded mathematically as various kinds
of transformations, are meant to capture those induced by
the normal variability of devices and environment condi-
tions at runtime. We developed a method to assess local
transformational robustness automatically by translating
this to MILP problems. The experimental results showed
that the toolkit we introduced returns correct and viable
results against the MNIST dataset for all the transforma-
tions considered.
In further work, firstly, we plan to improve the perfor-
mance of the back-end for the problems considered in-
cluding experimenting with other technologies such as
SMT and mixed approaches. Secondly, while we fo-
cused on local properties in this paper, i.e., properties con-
cerning a single image, we intend to extend the work to
study (global) robustness with respect to classes of im-
ages. Lastly, while the paper focused on images, the no-
tion of local transformational robustness is general to be
applied in other contexts where CNNs are used including
audio recognition.
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